Where War and Sanctions Split Payment Systems 2026
Introduction
On September 4, 2026, reports that CIA Director John Ratcliffe had visited Moscow were followed by signs that Vladimir Putin is pushing harder for a military win in Ukraine. Five years of war and sanctions have left a measurable signature in the financial data — and it is not what a casual observer might expect.
The economies at the center of the conflict and the sanctions regime around it combine high account ownership and high digital payment adoption with strikingly low credit-card ownership. Russia: 79.3% of adults hold an account and 87.4% use digital payments, yet only 25.1% own a credit card. Iran: 91.1% account ownership, 86% digital payments, 12.4% credit cards. Venezuela: 87.3% accounts, 75.5% digital payments, 16.1% cards.
The card gap is the fingerprint of international card networks withdrawing — and it separates these economies from the global pattern, where card ownership usually rises alongside account ownership. This report ranks the war- and sanctions-affected economies on the payment numbers that show the split.
The Data: where accounts outrun cards
The table shows account ownership, digital payment adoption, and credit-card ownership for the economies most affected by war and sanctions, with inflation and loan-book strain alongside:
| Economy | Account ownership | Digital payments | Credit cards | NPL ratio |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Iran | 91.1% (2024) | 86.0% (2024) | 12.4% (2024) | — |
| China | 89.4% (2024) | 88.7% (2024) | 46.0% (2024) | 1.7% (2021) |
| Ukraine | 87.6% (2024) | 82.9% (2024) | 41.1% (2024) | 37.4% (2023) |
| Venezuela | 87.3% (2024) | 75.5% (2024) | 16.1% (2024) | — |
| Kazakhstan | 87.0% (2024) | 85.0% (2024) | 26.5% (2024) | 2.9% (2023) |
| Poland | 86.1% (2024) | 82.1% (2024) | 20.3% (2024) | 2.3% (2023) |
| Turkiye | 81.6% (2024) | 71.4% (2024) | 43.7% (2024) | 1.5% (2023) |
| Russia | 79.3% (2024) | 87.4% (2021) | 25.1% (2021) | 5.5% (2022) |
For comparison, the world’s highest account ownership is Iceland at 99.9%, and the highest credit-card ownership is Canada at 82.7%. In a typical high-income economy, account ownership and card ownership move together; in the sanctions-affected group above, the two diverge by 50–75 percentage points.
What the split means
Where cards disappear, other rails take over. In Russia, the withdrawal of international card networks after 2022 pushed payments onto domestic rails — bank transfers and the national payment system — so digital payment adoption stayed high even as card ownership stalled at 25.1%. Iran shows the same pattern at a more extreme level: 86% of adults use digital payments, but cards are a marginal product at 12.4%, because the international card infrastructure never operated there in force.
The neighbor contrast. Poland and Kazakhstan — not under the same sanctions regime — also show moderate card ownership (20.3% and 26.5%), so the gap is not only a sanctions story; card penetration is simply thinner across this region. But the sanctioned trio (Russia, Iran, Venezuela) shows the widest gap between digital adoption and card ownership anywhere in the dataset.
War adds the loan-book cost. Ukraine’s nonperforming loan ratio of 37.4% (2023) is the highest of 144 economies tracked — more than double the next-worst major economy. A banking system where more than a third of loans are non-performing cannot intermediate credit normally. For the mechanism, see our explainer on what nonperforming loans mean for bank stability and how conflict turns healthy loans bad.
Regional patterns
Three distinct patterns emerge:
- Sanctioned card deserts (Iran, Venezuela, Russia): high inclusion by account and digital-payment measures, cards below 26% — the international network withdrawal signature.
- Wartime credit strain (Ukraine): account ownership holds up at 87.6% and payments keep working, but the loan book collapses under invasion — the financial cost of war shows up in credit, not in payment access.
- The resilient frontier (Poland, Kazakhstan, Turkiye): moderate card penetration, clean loan books (1.5–2.9% NPLs) despite proximity to the conflict.
Context
The pattern matters beyond the conflict zone. Wherever international card networks exit — through sanctions, capital controls, or market exits — account ownership can stay high while card ownership stalls, and payments migrate to bank transfers, mobile money, and domestic schemes. The same dynamic showed up in our earlier report on where Iran sanctions bite and in our explainer on how sanctions reshape cross-border payments. It is also why account ownership alone does not guarantee card access: the two indicators answer different questions, and sanctions widen the gap between them.
Sources & method
Account ownership, digital payment adoption, and credit-card ownership come from the World Bank Global Findex (2021 and 2024 waves — the data year cited for each figure). Nonperforming loan ratios come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (FB.AST.NPER.ZS). Figures are observed values from their cited years; the site publishes no projections for these indicators. See our methodology page for how the datasets are assembled.